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Abstract— This paper introduces a Trust-Domain based 
security architecture for mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs). The aim of this architecture is twofold: to use 
trust as a basis to establish keys between nodes in a 
MANET, and to utilize trust as a metric for establishing 
secure distributed control in infrastructure-less MANETs. 
We define metrics for nodes to establish and manage trust, 
and use this mutual trust to make decisions on establishing 
group and pair-wise keys in the network. The impact of 
mobility of the nodes on trust establishment is considered 
and further its use as a means of propagating trust through 
the network is investigated. We introduce the concept of 
self-organizing trust-based Physical-Logical Domains 
(PLDs) as a means of grouping nodes for distributed 
control in the network.
Keywords: Distributed Control, Key Establishment, Mobile 
Ad-hoc Networks, Mobility, Security, Trust 
1. INTRODUCTION
Having a metric for making informed decisions is important 
in ad-hoc networks deployable in the military environment 
as well as in disaster management applications. For 
example, consider the scenario where a terrorist attack has 
taken place. The First Responder System has been rapidly 
deployed using ad-hoc networks, and coordination between 
the constituents of the responder and rescue systems has 
been initiated. Trust is very important here because an 
attack has already taken place, and now the adversary may 
try to destroy the relief operations by compromising the first 
responder system. As another example, consider the 
scenario of a multi-national military force deployed in a war 
zone. The different constituents of the force should be able 
to effectively communicate with each other without the risk 
of information compromise [1]. Trust is the most important 
factor in such situations to make decisions regarding whom 
to communicate with. 
Existing key management and generation schemes for ad-
hoc networks do not specify any constraints on establishing 
pair-wise keys between pairs of nodes, and group keys in an 
entire cluster or group. There are several well known 
schemes for key generation and management [2], [3], that 
are either based on secret sharing, threshold cryptography, 
or assume that nodes are preloaded with some keying 
material that helps them establish keys as required. 
These schemes only specify mechanisms to prevent false 
key generation and compromise of other nodes’ keys, if a 
node is eventually compromised. Thus these schemes 
inherently assume nodes to be non-malicious at the time of 
key establishment. To the best of our knowledge, there are 
no known formal schemes for functional verification or 
judgment on key establishment requests from other nodes. 
Specifically, if a node is unknown, keys would still be 
established with it as long as the infrastructure for 
establishing keys is present. Schemes involving a trusted 
third party for key establishment are deemed impractical for 
ad-hoc networks due to the limitations on finding such an 
authority, and therefore, are not considered as a practical 
solution.    
Additionally, self organization of ad-hoc network nodes 
into clusters has been studied in the literature [4] to induce 
distributed control in such networks which are otherwise 
infrastructure-less. Present ad-hoc network clustering 
schemes use physical location as a metric to cluster the 
nodes [5]. Any node can elect to become a cluster head and 
can propagate cluster joining requests to its k-hop neighbors 
through various flooding mechanisms. This choice of 
cluster formation is arbitrary and does not take security into 
account. A node that is malicious could initiate a cluster 
formation announcement and could potentially compromise 
all nodes that elect to join its cluster. 
The problems that we want to address in this paper are the 
following: (a) To define a metric that the nodes can use to 
make decisions on whether to establish keys with other 
nodes in an ad-hoc network, given that the infrastructure for 
establishing such keys exists, and (b) To define a basis on 
which nodes in an ad-hoc network can securely group 
together, so that some kind of distributed control can be 
introduced in an otherwise infrastructure-less network. We 
propose to use trust between the nodes, as a mechanism to 
solve both these problems. We present an architecture that 
uses trust as a metric for nodes to (a) Make decisions on 
establishing keys with other nodes in the network, and (b) 
Group together into trust-based domains. 
1.1 Related Work and Paper Organization 
The idea of using trust to mitigate security threats has been 
an important area of research [6]. Trust establishment and 
management between entities (nodes or agents) can be done 
through a central trusted authority or in a distributed fashion 
by nodes [7], or a combination of both. Related work in this 
area [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], employ both these techniques. For 
example, Zhou et al. [13] propose the idea of utilizing 
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threshold cryptography to distribute trust in ad-hoc 
networks, Davis [14] proposes the use of certificates based 
on hierarchical trust model to manage trust, and Eschenauer 
et al. [1] contrast between trust establishment in ad-hoc 
networks and the Internet. Our approach is new and 
different from the existing ones in that no known schemes 
use trust as a metric for the problems that this paper 
attempts to address.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formalizes the 
notion of trust between two nodes as a combination of self 
trust and group trust. Section 3 quantifies trust between two 
nodes and describes schemes for trust management. Section 
4 describes the notion of Trust Domains and organization of 
nodes in ad-hoc networks into domains based on trust 
values. We finally conclude the paper in Section 5 with a 
summary of its contributions, limitations and proposed 
future work. 
 2. TRUST FORMALIZATION
This section describes the trust formalization. Our schemes 
draw ideas from the Watchdog and Pathrater schemes [15], 
utilized for cooperation of nodes in ad-hoc networks. We 
define a node n’s trust on another node m:
Tn,m = ?1 nTmS + ?2 nTmO                                                     (1) 
In the above equation, Tn,m is evaluated as a function of two 
parameters: 
(a) nT
m
S: Node n’s self evaluated trust on m; n computes 
this by directly monitoring m.
(b) nT
m
O: Weighted sum of other nodes’ trust on m
evaluated by n. In eq. (1), ?1 and ?2 are weighting factors 
such that ?1 + ?2 = 1. Thus, by varying ?1 and ?2, n can 
vary the weight of self evaluated vs. others trust in 
calculating its total trust on m. Here, 0 ? { Tn,m , nTmS, nTmO } 
? 1, and thus eq. (1) is normalized. 
2.1. Evaluating nT
m
S
Node n computes this value by directly monitoring m when 
m is in its radio range. We define nT
m
S as
nT
m
S = ƒ(?, ?)                         (2)  
Node n’s self trust on m is a function (ƒ) of traffic statistic 
functions ? and ? computed by monitoring m. Precise 
definition of ƒ can be implementation dependent. We 
assume ƒ to be a weighted sum of ? and ?. Here, ? is a 
function of monitored traffic statistics pertaining purely to 
traffic volume and ? is a function of monitored traffic 
statistics pertaining to information integrity. Lee et al. [16] 
compile node monitoring statistics for one hop neighbors in 
ad-hoc networks. Thus, node n can monitor the following 
statistics for a one-hop neighbor m: Incoming packets on m,
outgoing packets from m, outgoing packets of which m is 
the source, incoming packets of which m is the destination, 
incoming packets on m from n, etc. Based on these 
monitored statistics we define ? and ? as: 
? = g (? 1, ? 2, ? 3, ? 4, ? 5, ? 6)          (3) 
? = h (?1, ?2)           (4) 
Here g and h can again be defined based on the 
implementation. Likeƒ, we assume them to be weighted 
summation of their constituent parameters. These 
parameters are defined below: 
? 1: packets sent by m to n that are dropped by m  
? 2: total packets dropped by m 
? 3: packets dropped by m due to congestion 
? 4: packets dropped by m due to unknown reasons 
? 5: n’s assessment of m’s priority to m’s self packets vs. all 
        other nodes’ packets 
? 6: packet forwarding delay by m 
?1: packets misrouted by m  
?2: packets falsely injected by m 
Based on implementation, other parameters can also be 
defined. 
2.2. Evaluating nT
m
O
In the representation nT
m
O, O is the set of other nodes whose 
trust on m is utilized by n in evaluating its own trust on m.
O is defined as:  
O = {∀ node o ∈ O ? o is in the range of both m and n,
and ∃ Tno, s.t. Tno? “good”}. 
“good” is a threshold value for demarcating Unknown and 
Good trust-regions and this is further explained in Sec. 3. 
In this section we present four schemes for computing the 
value of nT
m
O, where n, m and O have their usual meanings 
and nT
m
O is defined as above.  
1. Optimistic or Greedy approach: This is the simplest 
approach. nT
m
O is computed by selecting the largest value of 
the product Ti,m x Tn,i for all values of i in the set O. In other 
words, node n uses the highest value of trust that nodes in 
the set O assign to the node m, weighting it with its own 
trust on the nodes in the set O.
nT
m
O = max i ? O { (Ti,m x Tn,i) }                                           (5) 
2. Simple Average of Weighted Products: The value of 
nT
m
O is the simple average of the product of Ti,m and Tn,i
over all the nodes i in the set O.
? (Ti,m x Tn,i)
nT
mo =    i ? O                                         (6) 
                             |O| 
 where | O | is the cardinality of the set O.
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3. Weighted Average: The value of nT
m
O is the weighted 
average of Ti,m over all the nodes in the set O. The weight 
associated with each Ti,m is Tn,i.
? (Ti,m x Tn,i)
             nT
m
O =  
i ? O                              (7) 
?  Tn,i
 i ? O 
 Alternatively, if we normalize with respect to Ti,m we get, 
? (Tn,i  x Ti,m)
nT
m
O =
i ? O (8)
?  Ti,m
            i ? O 
Thus, in the weighted average approach the weighted 
products of Ti,m and Tn,i are normalized either with Ti,m or 
Tn,i for all values of i in the set O.
4. Double Weighted Approach: In this approach, we 
further try to improve on the value of nT
m
O computed from 
the weighted average approach by normalizing the product 
of Ti,m and Tn,i with respect to both Ti,m and Tn,i.
? (Ti,m / ? Tj,m) x Tn,i
i?O j?O
(9)
 nT
m
O =
?Tn,i
i?O
Alternatively, 
? (Tn,i / ? Tn,j) x Ti,m
             i?O, j?O
 nT
m
O = (10)
?  Ti,m
                    i?O
Note that the first scheme is the simplest, but it is based on 
the accuracy of trust on one node. This scheme would be 
the most vulnerable to misdecisions and failure due to 
malicious misrepresentation of trust  by a single node, or a 
collusion of nodes. Schemes 2, 3, and 4 increase in 
complexity of evaluation, but should also provide a 
corresponding enhanced accuracy in the evaluation of trust. 
We are currently performing simulations to verify the 
validity of this assumption.  
3. TRUST EVALUATION
This section describes trust evaluation (Fig. 1), i.e., trust 
establishment and management between nodes. We explain 
the initial trust establishment procedure between a pair of 
nodes that are one-hop neighbors and explain the 
consequences of node mobility on the existing trust between 
a pair of nodes.  
We define trust to be non-transitive. Thus Tn,m ? Tm,n. Both 
m and n independently evaluate Tm,n and Tn,m respectively, 
through the schemes described above. The associability of 
trust will be addressed in Sec. 4. Trust evaluation between 
the nodes is defined as a four phase process: Initiation and 
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Monitoring, Query and Evaluation, Updating, and the 
Restructuring phase. There is an optional fifth phase: Re-
establishment after declared malicious. The five trust phases 
of the trust evaluation process are outlined in Fig. 1 by 
tracing a sample trust value of a node m continuously 
evaluated by another node n (Tn, m) over a period of time. 
Fig. 1 depicts three trust regions: Good, Uncertain, and 
Bad. Nodes above the good trust threshold, i.e., in the Good
region are highly trusted one-hop neighbors of n, and if they 
are one-hop neighbors of m also, then their trust will be 
utilized by n in evaluating nT
m
O. The nodes in Uncertain
region are those with intermediate trust values, and their 
trust is not utilized in evaluating nT
m
O. Nodes in the Bad
region are those marked as malicious by n. This is further 
explained in the subsections below.  
3.1. Initiation and Monitoring Phase
This is the phase when the network is newly deployed, or a 
new node joins the network.  In a newly deployed network, 
nodes have no traffic statistics history about the network 
and their neighbors, and this is akin to the training or 
learning phase for the network. The scenario of a new node 
joining the network is similar, as the node does not have 
any trust information about its neighbors and vice-versa. 
This is the period when the new nodes have not established 
keys with their one-hop neighbors (or any other nodes). 
During this phase, the new node(s) monitors its one-hop 
neighbors. The monitoring node (n) switches over to 
promiscuous mode and listens for all packets transmitted by 
the monitored node (m). It collects the statistics mentioned 
in Sec. 2.1. For example, node m joins the network at time T 
= 0, and becomes a one-hop neighbor of n. This phase is 
represented by the section AA’ of the curve in Fig. 1. Thus 
a new or unknown node is given a “bare” trust value.  
During this phase, nodes will not send any sensitive data to 
their neighbors, unless timely delivery is absolutely 
essential (e.g., in disaster management scenarios it might be 
critical to exchange information immediately after network 
deployment). Time critical data is transmitted immediately 
utilizing flooding or any other techniques. All other 
sensitive information is buffered by the node till trust has 
been evaluated and keys have been established. Thus, our 
technique is a cautious combination of optimistic and 
pessimistic approaches: we strictly limit the nature and 
volume of critical data transmitted during this phase with 
the optimistic assumption that when the network is in start-
up phase, the probability of a malicious node assimilating 
enough information to compromise the network is very low. 
This is due to the relatively small amount of such data in the 
network vs. the large volume of set-up time control 
messages. It is also important to mention that this initiation 
phase lasts for a very short period of time and as soon as 
nodes have collected some information about their one-hop 
neighbors, they move to the evaluation phase.  
3.2. Query and Evaluation Phase  
During this phase, the nodes evaluate their self trust on their 
one-hop neighbors (e.g., nT
m
S) through a challenge response 
system. The nodes query their neighbors regarding the 
statistics they have already assimilated (defined in Sec. 2.1). 
This is akin to truth verification, as the monitoring nodes 
already know the correct answers to their queries. The 
neighbors’ trust evaluation is based on the accuracy of their 
responses. This has been explained in Sec. 2.1. Evaluation 
of nT
m
O is done as explained in Sec. 2.2. The Query and 
Evaluation phase is represented by A’B in Fig. 1.  
3.3. Updating Trust
As long as a node remains in the radio range, its trust is 
continuously evaluated and updated. Thus, monitoring and 
querying is performed even after trust has been established 
between the nodes. However, the periodicity of querying 
and monitoring is decreased with time if the trust value 
stabilizes and is maintained at a certain level (e.g., the 
ceiling value of Good Region in Fig. 1). In Fig. 1, these are 
represented by BC and CC’. 
3.4. Restructuring Phase  
This phase takes into account two different scenarios and 
their effect on inter-node trust values: 
(a) Trusted one-hop neighbors move out of radio range due 
to node mobility: A node, say m, which was previously in 
the radio range of a node n, now moves out of its radio 
range due to node mobility (at time Tdis in Fig. 1). The value 
of ?1 (the proportion of self trust in overall trust) now 
decays exponentially as:
?1 = c.e-?.t                                                                         (12) 
Parameter ? is the decay factor which is determined by the 
infrastructure and mobility constraints of the network, and c 
is some constant. Node n now fixes nT
m
S , to the value at 
time Tdis (just before m moved away). But since ?1
exponentially decays, n’s importance on nT
m
S in calculating 
Tn,m decreases with time. If the node m is outside n’s radio 
range for a time period ?tmax, and if Tn,m > Tgood, then at Ttsh
= (Tdis + ?tmax), ?1 is forced to 0 (i.e., ?1 = 0), and Tn,m is 
reduced to Tgood (i.e., Tn,m = Tgood). This is shown in Fig. 1 
by the curve C’D and the line DF?. If the value of Tn,m  is 
below the Good Region then it is left unchanged.  This 
scenario is shown in Fig. 1 by the curve C’F. This value is 
kept constant as the history information of node n (shown 
by F’G and FG in Fig. 1) for the scenario that m and n
eventually return to each other’s radio range. 
(b) Trusted one-hop neighbors that had previously moved 
out of radio range are now back in radio range: the node m,
after moving out of n’s radio range, eventually returns back 
in the range of n (i.e., again becomes a one-hop neighbor of 
n). Re-evaluation of Tn,m by n is now required for potentially 
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restoring Tn,m to the highest trust value, as m becomes 
directly monitored again. This re-evaluation of Tn,m is 
similar to the Initiation and Monitoring phase (Sec. 3.1). 
The only difference is that this re-evaluation does not begin 
from the bare trust value, but starts from the value of Tn,m
previously fixed by n (after m had moved out of its radio 
range). This is shown in Fig. 1 by the sequence of points 
G?HI and GHI. Similar computations are done by m.
3.5. Re-establishment Phase 
 This phase explains the scenario for a node m that was 
declared malicious previously by a node n and now it wants 
to re-associate with n. Consider the scenario when n’s trust 
on m is good, say at point H in Fig. 1. Assume that after 
monitoring m for some time node n discovers to have 
become malicious. This can be deduced by the challenge 
response scheme as describe in Sec. 3.1. The point of time 
when node n makes this conclusion is depicted by point I in 
Fig. 1. Now, depending upon the nature of malicious 
operations performed by m, node n drops the trust of node 
m into the bad region. The two levels J and J? show this 
drop in trust in the figure.  For serious malicious activities 
having a critical impact on the functioning of n itself, the 
trust of m is dropped to zero as shown by the point J. Zero 
represents the absolute minimum trust value possible (or 
highest distrust) in the network. For a malicious operation 
with a less severe effect, the trust can be dropped to any 
point in the Bad region as shown by the point J?. The two 
levels shown are just for illustration, but the new trust value 
of the malicious node can lie anywhere in the Bad region or 
it can be quantified into a number of levels based on the 
seriousness of offense. Trust re-establishment is based on 
the discretion of the node evaluating the trust (in this case 
node n). If node n does not want to immediately re-establish 
trust with node m, then the value of Tn,m is unchanged till n
decides to reconsider the trust establishment process. Trust 
increase after reevaluation, if at all initiated by the node n,
is linear, provided that m does not perform any more 
malicious operations. The angle ? in Fig. 1 represents the 
constant linear function for restoration of Tn,m. One 
important observation here is that a node for which the re-
establishment begins at point J? reaches the Good region 
earlier in comparison to a node for which the re-
establishment process begins at point J. 
4. TRUST MODEL AND TRUST DOMAINS
So far we have described the trust establishment and trust 
evaluation between pairs of nodes that have been one-hop 
neighbors at some point of time. In this section we extend 
our pair-wise trust model to include other nodes in the 
network which are not one-hop neighbors. We define a 
model through which non- neighbor nodes can establish and 
manage trust utilizing the five-phased trust evaluation 
procedure described in Sec. 3, thus providing a basis for 
establishing pair-wise keys between any pair of nodes, and 
also establishing group keys in the network. This model 
organizes nodes into trust-based clusters called Physical-
Logical Trust Domains (PLTDs), thus securely grouping 
nodes to induce distributed control in the otherwise 
infrastructure-less network. Member nodes in a PLTD can 
establish and share a domain (group) key.  We use node 
mobility to propagate trust throughout the network. In our 
scheme, nodes can belong to multiple PLTDs and there can 
be several overlapping PLTDs in a physical region. 
PLTD formation can be initiated by any node. A node n can 
announce its intention to form a PLTD by requesting nodes 
in the set P to join its PLTD (PLTD-n). P is defined as:  
P = {∀ node p ∈ P ? p is in the range of n, and ∃ Tn,p, s.t. 
Tn,p? “good”}.
Based on its individual trust on n, Tp,n, each node in P may 
either accept or decline to join PLTD-n, or it could invite n
to join its own PLTD if it has already initiated its own 
domain formation procedure. If at any time, the trust value 
of a node in PLTD-n, say m (Tn,m), falls below “bare” (see 
Fig. 1), then its domain membership is revoked by n, and 
this is announced to other members of PLTD-n.    
Now, if n wants to include a node z (non-neighbor) in 
PLTD-n, and z is a one hop neighbor of, say node m which 
is already a member of PLTD-n, then n can request m to 
invite z to join PLTD-n. Based on its own trust on z (Tm,z,),
m might accept or decline to forward this invitation. If m
forwards this invitation, then z can make its decision based 
on m’s evaluation of trust on n (Tm,n), and its own trust on m
(Tz,m). Thus, the simplest evaluation of  Tz,n could be: 
Tz,n = Tm,n * Tz,m                                                                (12)
This scheme assumes m’s willingness to provide z with Tm,n.
If z is included in PLTD-n, then since n is the request 
initiator, Tn,z is initially set to “good” (Fig. 1) by  default. 
Tn,z is continuously evaluated afterwards. Simplest 
evaluation of Tn,z could be:  
Tn,z = Tn,m * Tm,z                                                                (13) 
Again this scheme assumes n’s knowledge of Tm,z provided 
by m. If Tn,z falls below “bad” (Fig. 1) at any time, then n
revokes the membership of z in PLTD-n, and announces 
this decision to other member nodes. Node m can 
unilaterally decide to end its domain membership in PLTD-
n at anytime based on its trust on n (Tm,n) falling below a 
certain threshold.  
This scheme is significant in both maintaining an admissible 
level of trust within a PLTD (because domain members 
share a group key), and in limiting the domain size. It is 
important to have an upper bound on the membership size 
of a PLTD for control, overhead and management purposes. 
Domain size can also be limited by having an absolute 
upper bound, say k, on the number of member nodes. 
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This scheme is also extensible for establishing trust with 
nodes in other parts of the network, by utilizing trusted one-
hop neighbors which move away to other parts of the 
network due to node mobility. If node m moves away to a 
different part of the network, then n can utilize this to 
establish trust with nodes in the immediate vicinity of m’s
new location, provided it is still able to communicate with 
m. Such a trust establishment procedure would be strictly 
controlled by the minimum thresholds on pair-wise trust 
values as mentioned above in this section, and in Sec. 3.3. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presented schemes to formalize the notion of 
pair-wise trust between two nodes in an ad-hoc network. It 
also presented schemes to evaluate pair-wise trust as a 
combination of self trust and group trust. We suggested 
using this pair-wise trust to use as a basis for establishing 
pair-wise keys in a network. We also described extending 
the pair-wise trust to form trust-based domains in the 
network. This would be helpful in establishing group keys 
in the network and would also serve as a means of securely 
grouping nodes into domains in MANETS and would 
induce distributed control in such networks.  
We are currently evaluating the validity of the schemes 
proposed in this paper through simulations. We are also 
performing simulations to compare the various schemes 
described in Sec. 2. Our current research focuses on 
formalizing PLTDs to include collective decision making 
within domains. It also includes routing information 
between domains, especially through regions of unknown 
trust. We are working on integrating node trust models with 
link and path trust models. Our goal is to design a 
comprehensive trust based model for ad-hoc networks that 
can assure an admissible level of security through the use of 
trust. 
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